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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 34 Winter 1999 Number 2
SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTION: THE OCTOBER 1997 SUPREME
COURT TERM*
The Honorable Sven Erik Holmest
Today marks the fourth year of this conference, and I would like to congratulate
the University of Tulsa College of Law for its continuing sponsorship of this
important event.
Today also marks the fourth year that I have had the privilege of giving the
introduction to this symposium. In each of the last three years, I had the honor of
sharing the podium with Professor Bernard Schwartz, who would hold us all
spellbound with his closing lecture. For all that he contributed personally and as a
preeminent constitutional scholar, he will be missed very much. I am very proud to
report that I will teach one of the classes he taught, Constitutional Law II, here this
spring.
In September, I visited The People's Republic of China with four other judges
selected from around the country as part of the Clinton Administration's Rule of Law
exchange. During our many discussions, we were asked about the role of the
Supreme Court in the United States. It was widely believed, of course, that the
Supreme Court was the final appellate level in our legal system. In considering this
view, keep in mind the following facts. The Supreme Court is under no general legal
obligation to take appeals from decisions by lower courts, and the statistics are
compelling. Over the last ten years, the eleven circuit courts of appeals and the D.C.
Circuit have averaged a total of 24,048 decisions each year. By contrast, over the
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioners' Guide to the October 1997 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, at the University of Tulsa College of Law, December 11, 1998.
United States District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
201
1
Holmes: Introduction: The October 1997 Supreme Court Term
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
same period the Supreme Court has decided an average of 100 cases each year.2
Consistent with this average, the Court decided 91 cases in the 1997 Term.3 Based
on these numbers, it can be concluded that in fact the Supreme Court rarely acts as
the final appeals court in our system of justice.
If the primary responsibility of the Court is not to adjudicate disputes, then what
role does the Supreme Court play? It can be persuasively argued the role of the
Supreme Court is to articulate fundamental principles of law. Its decisions, whether
based on the Constitution or federal statutory construction, are intended to provide
guidance to government actors, including lower court judges, local state and federal
legislatures, and executives at all levels of government. These are the primary
consumers of Supreme Court opinions.
In the first two years of this seminar, I noted certain opinions by the Supreme
Court that were inconsistent with this mandate. Among those was Romer v. Evans,
4
which I suggested failed to establish specific rules of law that could be applied by
future courts to any other set of facts. Indeed, in November 1998 the Supreme Court
itself declined to accept certiorari in a case, Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati,5 in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a Cincinnati ordinance virtually identical to the Colorado statewide
referendum that was overturned in Romer.6 In short, there were no legal principles
articulated in Romer upon which an effective analysis of the Cincinnati ordinance
could be based.
Over the last two years, the work of the Court has changed dramatically. The
1996 Term was one of the most important and productive in history. While the
opinions handed down by the Court in the 1997 Term were not as dramatic, there is
no question the 1997 Term also deserves very high marks. The Court clearly met its
responsibility to provide guidance to lower courts on important issues of sexual
harassment, disabilities, and other areas where the need for established principles was
clear.
Since coming on the federal bench in 1995, over one-third of all of the civil
trials I have conducted involved some area of employment law, including Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"),7 the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),'
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),9 and the Family and Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA").'0 Due to a number of conflicting circuit court opinions, the
area was ripe for Supreme Court guidance. During the 1997 Term, the Court
1. SeeMemorandumfromLeslieMcGuire, BranchLibrarianfortheTenthCircuitLibrary-TusatoJudgeHolmes,




4. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
5. 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
6. See id. at 296-300.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000(e)(17) (1994).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
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responded by addressing four cases in the area of sexual harassment and two cases
under the ADA. Primary among the sexual harassment cases were Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth" and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.12 In these cases, the
Court determined under Title VII, an employer may be held vicariously liable to an
employee for a sexually hostile work environment created by a supervisor. 3 The
importance of these cases lies in the creation of an affirmative defense. The Court,
recognizing the need to maintain an incentive for employers to develop and enforce
effective sexual harassment policies, determined that an employer may interpose an
affirmative defense to a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment by
demonstrating (1) the employer has in place an effective sexual harassment policy,
and (2) the employee did not reasonably avail herself or himself of that policy.14 The
significance of these two cases cannot be understated. As I noted, my docket, like the
dockets of so many other trial judges, is jammed with these cases. These two
opinions promote employer efforts to deal effectively with sexual harassment in the
workplace, instruct employers on how to address sexual harassment issues, and give
clear and useful guidance to trial courts on how to adjudicate disputes that arise under
the statute.
In addition, the Court held in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services15 Title
VII protects individuals from being sexually harassed in the workplace by others of
the same sex,' 6 and held in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent SchoolDistrict17 under
Title IX a school district is not liable for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student
unless school district officials with authority to take corrective action had actual
notice of the harassment and deliberately failed to intervene.' 8 The Oncale decision
is notable primarily because every circuit to consider the question, other than the Fifth
Circuit from which this case arose, reached the same conclusion as the Supreme
Court. I myself expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit's view three years ago in a case
here in the Northern District entitled Ladd v. Sertoma Handicapped Opportunity
Program, Inc.'
9
The Court also decided two important cases under the ADA. In Pennsylvania
Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 20 the Court held a prison may not discriminate
against an inmate because of his disability.2' In this case, the correctional facility had
denied a prisoner admission to motivational boot camp because of hypertension.22 In
Bragdon v. Abbott,2' the Court held a person with asymptomatic HIV may not be
11. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
12. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
13. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270-71; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
14. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270-71; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
15. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
16. See id.at 1001-02.
17. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
18. Seeid. at1997.
19. 917 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Okla. 1995).
20. 118 S.Ct. 1952 (1998).
21. See id. at 1955.
22. See id. at 1953.
23. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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discriminated against by a health care provider, in this case a dentist, on the basis of
this disability.24 These opinions were not surprising. In fact, the legislative history
of the ADA clearly anticipates that AIDS would be covered by the Act. 5 The
opinions are significant to trial courts, however, because of the Supreme Court's
clear statement that the ADA means precisely what it says, and that cases arising
under its provisions are best resolved by strict statutory construction.
In my judgment, at least two other cases decided last term will have an
immediate impact on the work of trial courts. In Campbell v. Louisiana,6 the Court
held that a white criminal defendant has third-party standing to object to discrimina-
tion against African-Americans in the selection of grand jurors when the court
arbitrarily selected grand jury forepersons from outside the randomly selected grand
jury panel.27 In addition, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 28 the Court held that a
police officer who engages in a high speed automobile chase resulting in death does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment if the officer did not intend to harm the
suspects he was trying to apprehend.29 The Court unanimously held that the
appropriate test is whether the officer's alleged abuse of power "shocks the
conscience."'3 This will make future cases of this kind very difficult to maintain.
The final two cases I would like to highlight briefly are noteworthy in large part
because they are newsworthy. First, in Clinton v. New York,3 the Court declared
unconstitutional the granting by Congress of the line item veto power to the
President.32 Second, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States,33 the Court held the
attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client with no exception for criminal
cases.
34
Of course, the Swidler & Berlin case is just one of the cases arising out of the
investigation into the activities of President Clinton, At the present rate, this category
of cases may become the subject of an entire annual seminar all by itself. In the 1996
Term, of course, the Court decided the case of Clinton v. Jones,35 stating:
We think the district court may have given undue weight to the concern that a trial
might generate unrelated civil actions that could conceivably hamper the President
in conducting the duties of his office. If and when that should occur, the court's
discretion would permit it to manage those actions in such fashion (including
deferral of trial) that interference with the President's duties would not occur. But
24. See id. at2210-11.
25. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 102-39, at 52-53 (199 1); H. REP. No. 101-674, at 89 (1990).
26. 118 S.Ct. 1419(1998).
27. See id. at 1424.
28. 118S. Ct. 1719(1998).
29. See id. at 1720.
30. Id. at 1717.
31. 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
32. See id. at2108.
33. 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
34. See id. at 2087.
35. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
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no such impingement upon the President's conduct of his office was shown here.'
In the 1998 Term, the Supreme Court has refused to hear cases involving the
attorney-client privilege between the President and attorneys in the Office of the
White House Counsel,37 and whether the President's communications overheard by
the Secret Service are privileged. s
Moreover, if the Independent Counsel continues his work, the Whitewater grand
juries continue to serve, Congress continues to conduct impeachment proceedings,
and the legal system continues to grind against the political system, the possibility of
new constitutional law cases defining presidential authority is limited only by our
collective imagination.
These are just some of the important cases of the 1997 Term of the Supreme
Court. Again, I congratulate the University of Tulsa College of Law for its continued
good work in the area of constitutional law.
36. Id.at 1651.
37. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466(1998).
38. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
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